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This special issue of the Erasmus Law Review is dedica-
ted to the legitimacy of tax policies and acts devised by
international organizations.
A decade ago, countries were still unreceptive to any
attempts by international organizations to interfere in
their direct tax systems. States’ existence and, in turn,
the size of their infrastructure in the broadest sense
depend on their ability to levy tax on income. As a
result, they attach great importance to their sovereignty
in tax matters. In today’s liberalizing, globalizing and
digitalizing world, however, states are losing grip on
their ability to tax high net worth individuals (HNWIs)
and multinationals. Persons, entities and capital are now
more mobile than ever before, with the result that
HNWIs and multinationals are able to exploit differen-
ces in national tax systems (in terms of who is subject to
tax, the scope of the tax base and the level of the appli-
cable tax rates) and can consequently reduce their effec-
tive tax burdens substantially. And they are being assis-
ted in this respect by tax competition among countries
competing for investments in an effort to maintain or
even increase their national tax revenues. Since the
financial and subsequent economic crisis, however, the
major Western economies in particular have realized
that the only way for countries to counter the eroding of
their tax revenues is to join forces under the umbrella of
an international organization. In doing so they are
acknowledging that tax policies based on ‘every man for
himself’ will in the long run simply lead to lower tax
revenues. As a result, the G20, OECD, IMF, World
Bank and EU are all increasingly making their presence
felt in the field of taxation, with many of these organiza-
tions’ recent proposals prompting changes in countries’
national tax legislation. International organizations have
also sought to oversee countries’ implementation of and
compliance with these proposals. Given the far-reaching
implications of these developments for countries’ sover-
eignty in tax matters, we may question whether the
process by which these international organizations
arrive at such proposals and their monitoring rules can
be considered legitimate. As these developments are still
relatively recent, they have so far attracted little atten-
tion from tax academics. And that is the gap that this
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special issue, comprising four contributions, aims to fill
to a certain degree.
In the first contribution, Sissie Gonzalez-Fung discuss-
es the package of policy reforms published by the
OECD on behalf of the G20 in November 2015 and that
are designed to curb base erosion and profit shifting
(BEPS) by multinationals. In response to the question-
ing of the BEPS project’s legitimacy by tax academics,
politicians and civil society groups, the author explores
the validity of the ‘democratic deficits’ complaints
lodged against the G20 and the OECD as global tax reg-
ulators in the BEPS project, as well as the norms reflec-
ted in the project itself.
In the second contribution, Leo Neve examines the
legitimacy of the way in which the Global Forum on
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes exercises its regulatory authority. He con-
cludes that this authority is not being exercised legiti-
mately as, by preventing jurisdictions from adhering to
due process rules, the Global Forum is violating the rule
of law.
In the third and fourth contributions, Sophia Murillo
and Uyanga Berkel-Dorlig consider the legality of acts
by the IMF and the World Bank in the field of tax, and
the possible implications for these acts’ legitimacy. Both
authors conclude that not only is there a deficit in the
legal basis for such acts, but also a legitimacy deficit in
the way these organizations arrive at such acts in the
field of taxation. They both argue that change is needed
if these acts are to attain greater legitimacy.
I wish you every enjoyment in reading this special issue.
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